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I. INTRODUCTION
With the audacity of Nietzsche, some have declared “notice pleading is dead.”1
“Notice pleading,” which has long been the hallmark of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure since their adoption in 1938, requires that a plaintiff need only state
enough about his or her claim in a complaint to put a defendant on “notice” as to
what the claim is. It is true that the text of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has not changed; a “short and plain statement of the claim” is all that is
supposedly required for a pleading to suffice.2 Nor has the text of the 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss been altered, which nips a controversy in the bud by preventing a
pleading from proceeding if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.”3 But none can deny that when the Supreme Court handed
down Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly4 in the spring of 2007, the standard for
pleading and the motion to dismiss had been transformed from the longstanding
endorsement of notice pleading expressed in the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson.5 In
Bell Atlantic, the Court abrogated the low-threshold pleading standard outlined in
Conley, which held that a complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
unless the plaintiff could prove “no set of facts” to support his or her claim,6 and
1

A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008) (“Notice
pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility pleading.”); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards
After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007) (“The best
reading of Bell Atlantic is that the new standard is absolute, that mere notice pleading is dead
for all cases and causes of action.”).
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 8. In December 2007, a new version of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure went into effect that attempted to clarify the wording and format of the Rules. No
substantive changes were made to the Rules.
3

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

4

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

5

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

6

Id. at 45.
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replaced it with a new pleading standard that required a complaint to be “plausible
on its face.”7 But what would this change look like in application? Despite the
Supreme Court’s second attempt at outlining the parameters of “plausibility”
pleading in its 2009 decision of Ashcroft v. Iqbal,8 courts, scholars, and professors of
civil procedure continue to wrestle with whether the vaguely presented “plausibility”
standard is the death-knell to notice pleading at the federal level.
Federal circuit and district courts have readily adopted the “plausibility”
language of Bell Atlantic in interpreting motions to dismiss, as they must. However,
within the federal courts, multiple and divergent interpretations as to what a
“plausible” complaint actually looks like have emerged. Still, if there is truth in the
assertion that notice pleading is dead, it is only a half-death in Ohio and other states
whose local rules of civil procedure were initially created to mirror the Federal
Rules. Ohio, along with twenty-five other states, adopted the interpretive “no set of
facts” language of Conley to decide whether a pleading passes muster to survive a
motion to dismiss.9 When Bell Atlantic disavowed that language as having “earned
its retirement,”10 states like Ohio were faced with a decision: Must we, too, retire our
Conley standard? The short answer is, no. States are free to have rules of civil
procedure that are distinct from the Federal Rules or to interpret rules differently
even if textually identical. Yet, the question of whether to align with the new, but
vague, Bell Atlantic plausibility standard for pleading is a far more complex question
to which states must give great consideration. Courts must take into account issues
of forum shopping, the interplay of pleading standards and methods of regulating
discovery, consider practitioner familiarity with the Conley threshold, and access to
the courts to plaintiffs.
Ohio has only briefly addressed the entrance of Bell Atlantic onto the pleading
stage, and, thus far, Ohio state courts have mostly retained the Conley standard for
determining pleadings. However, multiple pleading standards are emerging, making
the issue ripe for a determination by the Supreme Court of Ohio as to what the true
pleading standard is for Ohio. This Note will explain why Ohio should preserve
Conley, even if doing so diverges from the original intent of federal-state uniformity
embodied by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part II outlines a brief history of
pleading at the federal level and within Ohio, including an overview of the similarity
of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure as compared to its Federal counterpart. Part III
examines the majority decision and dissent of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and the
Supreme Court’s first reference to Bell Atlantic in Erickson v. Pardus.11 Part IV
surveys the landscape of pleading after Bell Atlantic, with special emphasis on the
adoption of Bell Atlantic in recent decisions in the Sixth Circuit and Ohio district
courts—as well as the noteworthy absence of discussion of Bell Atlantic within Ohio
state courts. Part V discusses the importance of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which confirmed
that Bell Atlantic represents a significant shift away from notice pleading. Finally,
Part VI argues that Ohio should resist the urge to adopt Bell Atlantic’s standard
7

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 570.

8

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).

9

Conley, 355 U.S. at 45; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.

10

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 563.

11

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
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because the differences between the Ohio Rules and the Federal Rules reflect state
policy choices, forum shopping is unlikely, and Bell Atlantic offers no clear
advantages over Conley.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEADING
A. The Path to Unified Federal Rules
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938 with the twin goals
of establishing a set of uniform rules among all federal courts and establishing
uniform rules between state and federal courts.12 Yet, the Federal Rules were not the
first response to a call for uniformity among rules of court. In 1847, the New York
state legislature called “for a uniform course of proceeding in all cases whether of
legal or equitable cognizance.”13 The New York Code of 1848 was born only a year
later and created “a single form of action . . . known as the civil action,” in which
parties were to plead facts in a simple and concise form.14 Although the new “code
pleading” was a great step forward because it abolished the distinction between
courts of law and courts of equity, it did not prove to be as simple as planned:
“codifiers and the courts failed to appreciate that the difference between statements
of fact and statements of law is almost entirely one of degree only.”15 And although
code pleading continued to spread among the jurisdictions,16 a unified system of
procedure was still not achieved.
Federal procedure remained extremely complicated and required a skilled
practitioner in order to navigate through the distinct proceedings of the federal courts
at law and the federal courts at equity.17 Courts at equity enjoyed uniform rules due
to a rule-making power granted by the Supreme Court by express statute.18 The
success of this unified system of procedure, embodied in the Equity Rules of 1912,
influenced later reform in the court of law, where little uniformity existed.19
Congress recognized a desire for uniformity of procedures for common law claims
through its creation of the federal courts in the Conformity Act of 1789, although it,
too, did not subsequently result in procedural consistency.20 The Conformity Act of
12
Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the
United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1117 (1934).
13

CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 7, at 22 (2d ed. 1947)
(citing N.Y. LAWS 1847, c. 59, § 8) (quotations omitted).
14

Id. at 22-23.

15

Id. at 23.

16

Id. § 8, at 23. States continued to adopt the code, and by 1947, it was in force in thirtytwo states and territories. Id. Other jurisdictions could be described as “quasi-code and
common-law jurisdictions” due to a varying degrees in which they embraced the code and
maintained common law systems. Id.
17

Id. § 9, at 31.

18

Id. at 32-33 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 723, 730 (2006)).

19

Id. at 33.

20

Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93; see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1002, at 11 (3d ed. 2002).
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1789 required the federal procedures for common law to “be the same in each state
respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.”21 To
increase federal-state intrastate uniformity, Congress passed the Conformity Act of
1792, which “wedded federal procedure to a state’s procedure as it existed in 1789,
creating ‘static’ uniformity” among the federal and state courts.22 In other words,
under the 1792 Conformity Act, federal courts were supposed to align their “forms
of writs, executions and other process” with those that had been used by state courts
under the Conformity Act of 1789.23 However, the Conformity Act of 1792 also
allowed federal courts to make “such alterations and additions as the said courts
respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient,”24 which allowed
“disuniformity to surface” as the courts evolved and used their discretion to vary
from state procedures.25
The American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a resolution calling for the
establishment of federal procedural rules in 1912,26 which eventually led to Congress
passing the Rules Enabling Act (REA) in 1934.27 The Supreme Court promulgated
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were adopted in 1938.28 Again, the
central purpose of the rules was to promote uniformity both among federal courts
and in court proceedings between the state and federal courts.29 Although the states
had no legal obligation to adopt the new rules and had, in fact, been functioning
under non-uniform standards for decades, reformers believed that the new federal
21

Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93.

22

Z.W. Julius Chen, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and
Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2008).
23

Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.

24

Id.

25

Chen, supra note 22, at 1434.

26

Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, in
REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 434,
434-35 (1912).
27

See Chen, supra note 22, at 1435. Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana was a critic of
promulgating uniform rules at the federal level and prevented the passage of the REA until
after his death in 1933. Id. at 1436. Chen describes the period of tension between the passage
of the ABA’s resolution in 1911 and the REA’s passage in 1934:
Establishing federal rules would clearly create federal interstate uniformity, but
arguably at the cost of federal-state intrastate uniformity. Echoing arguments
supporting the early Conformity Acts, Senator Walsh, the chief critic of federally led
uniformity, clung to the notion that the status quo prevented the evils inherent in a
dual system, one state and one federal, and defeated the ABA’s proposals over the
next twenty years. . . .
With Senator Walsh’s death in 1933, the scene became ripe for the passage of the
REA, and soon after, the Federal Rules.
Id.
28

See Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938-1958: Two Decades
of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 436-38 (1958).
29

Sunderland, supra note 12.
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rules would serve as a model for states and would be embraced by them.30 Indeed, a
substantial majority of state civil court procedural systems adopted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in total or have allowed the Federal Rules to strongly influence
their state procedural systems.31
B. Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
1. Rule 8
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules requires that a pleading contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”32 In what
has been characterized as the “keystone” of the pleading system embodied by the
Federal Rules, Rule 8 was meant to simplify the complicated technical pleading
requirements of earlier systems by being “construed liberally so as to do substantial
justice.”33 Gone were the days of the common law practice in which successive
rounds of pleading were entertained in an attempt to reduce the dispute to a single
issue of law or fact.34 Also replaced were the subsequent code pleading
requirements, which demanded the pleading of facts but not evidence, and which
placed an emphasis on distinguishing among “evidentiary facts,” “ultimate facts,”
and “conclusions.”35 Pleadings were no longer the insurmountable hurdle that a
plaintiff had to overcome in order to bring an action to court. Instead, Rule 8
established “notice pleading,” the purpose of which was to put defendants on notice
of the claims that were being asserted against them.36 Discovery and pretrial
motions became the new forum in which issues were to be managed and potentially
eliminated before trial.37

30

See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.

31

John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1369, 1377 (1986).
32

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

33

5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1202, at 87 (3d ed. 2004).
34
Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 896 (2008).
35

5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 1216, at 207; see also Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 574
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“‘it is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among “ultimate
facts,” “evidence,” and “conclusions.”. . . The pleading spectrum, passing from evidence
through ultimate facts to conclusions, is largely a continuum varying only in the degree of
particularity with which the occurrences are described.’”) (citing Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel
H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV.
518, 520-21 (1957)).
36

5 WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, supra note 33, § 1216, at 234.

37

See Ward, supra note 34, at 898.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/9

6

2010]

PLEADING IN OHIO AFTER BELL ATLANTIC V. TWOMBLY

501

2. Conley v. Gibson
Although it was not the first Supreme Court case to address the new pleading
standard,38 the key case that defined the pleading standard at the federal level for half
a century was Conley v. Gibson.39 In Conley, the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Black, established that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”40 This famous “no
set of facts” language was quoted, cited, and applied as the threshold for a motion to
dismiss thousands of times before the Supreme Court deemed that such language had
“earned its retirement” in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.41
The facts of Conley presented a straightforward situation that became the
touchstone for analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint. In Conley, AfricanAmerican members of a Railway Union brought a class suit against the Union after
the railroad where the plaintiffs worked purportedly abolished forty-five jobs held by
the plaintiffs and other African-Americans.42 The complaint alleged that the jobs
were not in fact abolished, but were instead filled by whites.43 Despite a contract
between the Union and the Railroad that gave the employees in the bargaining unit
protection against discharge or loss of seniority, the complaint alleged that the Union
refused to represent the African-American employees against the discriminatory
discharges.44 The complaint charged that such discrimination violated the plaintiffs’
rights to fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, and the complaint
requested relief in the form of a declaratory judgment, injunction, and damages.45
The Union moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including through a
38
The Supreme Court first addressed the pleading standard for Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (1944). The Court examined
the sufficiency of a “home drawn” pro se complaint in which the plaintiff alleged that some of
the “tonics” he had imported from Italy were unlawfully stolen and others sold at auction by
the Collector of Customs. Id. at 774. The plaintiff’s first complaint was dismissed by the
District Court for failure to “state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” with leave to
amend. Id. When the plaintiff returned with a second complaint that demonstrated a
“heightened conviction that he was being unjustly treated,” the district court dismissed again
on the same grounds without leave to amend. Id. at 775. Although acknowledging that the
plaintiff “comes to us with increased volubility, if not clarity,” the Court held that the plaintiff
had stated enough to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 775. The Court explained that
under the new rules of civil procedure, only a “short and plain statement of the claim” was
necessary, not the pleading of “facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Id. The Court
held that “however inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his claims” and
refused to deprive the plaintiff of his day in court. Id.
39

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

40

Id. at 45-46.

41

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 563.

42

Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. Shepardizing of the “no set of facts” language revealed that it
had been cited more than 20,000 times as of February 21, 2010.
43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.
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12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”46
Although the Court reversed the action on other grounds, the Court took the
opportunity to address the arguments as to the sufficiency of the complaint.47 The
Conley Court declared that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”48 Instead, all
that is necessary for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is “‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”49 Echoing the liberal pleading
standard embodied by the Rules, the Court noted that “[t]he Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”50
The Conley standard embodied the liberal philosophy underpinning the Federal
Rules by reiterating that only in the rarest of circumstances—“unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim”—
would the pleading stage be the proper place to dispose of a case.51 To those who
still clung to the more complicated pleadings of the past, “The immediate effect of
Conley was to put an end to the murmurs of opposition to the new pleading standard
of the Federal Rules and to clarify that yes, the new liberal rules mean what they
say.”52 Indeed, one scholar distilled the Conley pleading doctrine down to four key
aspects.53 First, the statements of the complaint were explicitly to put the defendant
on notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the basis for that claim.54 Second, no factual
detail was necessary at the pleading stage to flesh out the claim.55 Third, only if
absolutely no claim existed—meaning that a plaintiff could prove no facts to support
liability—would dismissal be warranted.56 Finally, the pleading stage was not the

46

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

47
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45. It is interesting to note that Conley’s famous “no set of facts”
language is arguably dicta. The Court actually reversed the case by holding that it was error
for the lower courts to have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 44. There
was no need for the Court to have reached the motion to dismiss issue, but the Court went on
to consider the issue anyway: “Although the District Court did not pass on the other reasons
advanced for dismissal of the complaint we think it timely and proper for us to consider them
here.” Id. at 45.
48

Id. at 47.

49

Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

50

Id. at 48.

51

Id. at 45-46.

52

Spencer, supra note 1, at 435-36.

53

Id. at 438-39.

54

Id. at 438.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 438-39.
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proper forum for screening out claims on the merits.57 These liberal core
components of pleading supported the ideals of open access to justice by permitting
plaintiffs to have their day in court. The pre-trial functions of discovery and
summary judgment became the vehicles for analyzing the merits of a claim. This
ensured that considerably more time and energy would be devoted to the substance
of a claim than would be given at the pleading stage.
C. Ohio’s Rules of Civil Procedure
1. The Ohio Civil Rules
With the adoption of the Ohio Civil Rules in 1970,58 Ohio’s Rules became one of
twenty-three state rules that were “replicas” of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.59 By adopting state rules that mirrored the Federal Rules, Ohio created
“‘but one procedure for state and federal courts.’”60 Previously, Ohio was a code
pleading jurisdiction, having followed the lead of New York by adopting the New
York Code in 1853.61 In a 1986 comprehensive survey of state court rules of civil
procedure, procedural experts Professor Oakley and Professor Coon sought to
identify the level of uniformity among state court rules of civil procedure with the
Federal Rules.62 Because of the importance that the Federal Rules placed on
pleadings being liberally construed, the Professors placed special emphasis on
examining the state civil rules governing pleadings and motions directed at
pleadings. 63 Thus, one of their criteria for classification of a state as a “Federal
Rules Replica” 64 included that the pleading rules “as written and interpreted provide
without qualification for the liberal conception of ‘notice pleading’ practiced in
federal courts under the aegis of Conley v. Gibson.” 65 Ohio’s conformity to the
57

Id. at 439.

58

1 JAMES M. KLEIN & STANTON G. DARLING II, BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE: CIVIL
PRACTICE ix (2d ed. 2004) (containing annotated civil rules 1-16). The Ohio Civil Rules went
into effect July 1, 1970.
59

Oakley & Coon, supra note 31, at 1413. A state’s rules of civil procedure were
considered a “replica” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the two were essentially
identical in certain key aspects. Id.; see supra note 64.
60

Id. at 1372 (citing W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9,
at 45 (Wright ed. 1960)).
61

CLARK, supra note 13, § 8, at 24.

62

Oakley & Coon, supra note 31, at 1368.

63

Id. at 1373; see also CLARK, supra note 13, § 11, at 54. A major difference between the
old ways of Code Pleading and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was how each procedure
approached pleadings. Id. Under the Federal Rules, emphasis was placed on giving “fair
notice of the pleader’s case to the opposing party and to the court.” Id. Under Code Pleading,
emphasis was placed on outlining the issue to be tried with the material facts of the case. Id.
64
Oakley & Coon, supra note 31, at 1374. This was one criterion of nine used to
distinguish state court rules of procedure from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
determine the degree of symmetry between the two.
65

Id.
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Federal Rules, including its adoption of the Conley standard, created a federal-state
uniformity of practice and earned Ohio the status of a Federal Rules Replica.66
Like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ohio Rule 8(a) requires only that a
pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is
entitled to relief.”67 Likewise, Ohio Rule 12(B)(6) permits dismissal of a claim for
the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”68 After the adoption
of these rules, Ohio cases embraced the liberal pleading standard embodied by the
Federal Rules right from the start.69 In 1974, an Ohio Court of Appeals, citing
Conley and numerous federal court of appeals cases, noted that “few complaints fail
to meet the liberal standards of Rule 8 and become subject to dismissal.”70 One year
later, the Supreme Court of Ohio formally adopted the “no set of facts” language of
Conley in O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union.71
2. O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union
In O’Brien, the plaintiff sued a Union alleging that the Union had created a
“blacklist” with defamatory statements against the plaintiff and other landlords for
the purpose of deterring tenants from leasing from those landlords.72 In examining
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court adopted Conley and held that a complaint
should survive a motion to dismiss “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.’”73 The court acknowledged that
the plaintiff’s claim might indeed be difficult to prove in later stages of litigation.74
Yet, because the court reasoned that “there can be a set of facts which would entitle
appellee to relief,” the court held that the complaint was adequate to survive a
motion to dismiss: “Since it does not appear beyond doubt that appellee can prove no
set of facts which would entitle him to relief, the judgment . . . must be affirmed.”75
O’Brien has been continually cited for its adoption of Conley’s “no set of facts”
as the pleading standard in Ohio.76 Additionally, as discussed by Justice Stevens’
66

See id.

67

OHIO R. CIV. P. 8(A)(1).

68

OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6).

69

See Slife v. Kundtz Props., Inc., 318 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).

70

Id. (italics omitted).

71

O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 1975).

72

Id. at 753.

73

Id. at 755 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45).

74

Id. at 755.

75

Id. at 755-56.

76

Shepardizing revealed that, as of February 22, 2010, O’Brien has been cited more than
1,350 times for its recitation of the “no set of facts” standard for a motion to dismiss.
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio has cited O’Brien approvingly over fifty times. See,
e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 849 N.E.2d 268, 272 (Ohio 2006) (“In order for a
court to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his or her claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”); Taylor v. City of
London, 723 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (Ohio 2000) (“‘In order for a court to dismiss a complaint for
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dissent in Bell Atlantic, twenty-five other states adopted Conley as the state standard
for evaluating a pleading’s ability to survive a motion to dismiss.77
III. ENTER BELL ATLANTIC V. TWOMBLY
One of the difficulties in trying to understand the reach and impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly is that it was a fairly complex antitrust case dealing
specifically with the telecommunications industry; yet, the language used by the
Supreme Court in its holding extended far beyond the antitrust realm.78 Bell Atlantic
was a class-action antitrust case brought in the Southern District of New York by

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Civ.R.12(B)(6)), it must appear
beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to
recovery.’”); Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 668 N.E.2d 889, 891
(Ohio 1996) (“In a civil case before a court, ‘it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery’ before a motion to dismiss
can be granted.”) (citing O’Brien, 327 N.E.2d at 753).
77

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These states—in addition to Ohio—
include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at n.5. Additionally, at least eight other states adopted standards
substantially similar to that posed in Conley: Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Missouri, Utah, and Virginia. Id.
The Ohio case cited by Justice Stevens in his dissent is State ex rel. Turner v. Houk, 862
N.E.2d 104 (Ohio 2007) (per curiam). Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 578 n.5. In Turner, the Court
granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss because “it appears beyond doubt that [the
plaintiff] could prove no set of facts warranting the requested extraordinary relief in
mandamus.” 862 N.E.2d at 105. Turner was a curious choice to cite as an example of Ohio’s
use of Conley in that Turner does not cite O’Brien for the “no set of facts” standard. Id.
(citing State ex rel. Rashada v. Pianka, 857 N.E.2d 1220, p.*2 instead). The case was also a
per curiam decision. See id. It is likely that Justice Stevens cited Turner to show the
contemporary nature of the Conley “no set of facts” pleading standard in Ohio because Turner
had been decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio only two months before Bell Atlantic.
78

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 544. A brief explanation of the telecommunications industry is
helpful in understanding the situation presented in Bell Atlantic. The telecommunications
industry underwent a major transformation in 1984 when the American Telephone &
Telegraph Company (AT&T) was divested into a system of regional telephone service
monopolies, formally called “Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers” (ILECs) and commonly
known as “Baby Bells.” Id. at 548. While the AT&T monopoly was eliminated by this 1984
action in regard to long distance services, the ILECs continued to maintain a local telephone
service monopoly. Id. at 548.
In response to these monopolies, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in
order to restructure the market and “facilitate market entry” by other competitors. Id.; see also
Ward, supra note 34, at 902 (giving a concise history of the AT&T monopoly breakup).
Under this Act, the ILECs had an obligation to share their networks with competitors called
“Competitive Local Exchange Carriers” (CLECs). Bell Atl., 550 U.S. 549. However, after
this 1996 Act and several subsequent revisions to its terms by the Federal Communications
Commission, the ILECs allowed some CLECs into their territories, but the ILECs did not
actively compete with CLECs in each other’s territories. Id.
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local telephone and Internet subscribers against several major ILECs.79 The
plaintiffs sought damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief claiming
violations of Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits agreeing to
engage in conduct unfavorable to competition.80 Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed
that the Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) had “engaged in parallel
conduct” in their respective areas of service in order to inhibit the growth of
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs).81 Plaintiffs also claimed that the
defendant ILECs had entered into an illegal conspiracy to refrain from competing
against each other.82
The federal district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that
the allegations of parallel conduct, absent additional information, were not alone
sufficient to state a claim under Section One of the Sherman Act for which relief
could be granted.83 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that such additional “plus
factors” were not required at the pleading stage, and that the allegations of parallel
conduct were adequate to support the claim unless “no set of facts . . . would permit
a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product of
collusion rather than coincidence.”84 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to
address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations
of parallel conduct” more generally.85 The Court reversed the Second Circuit in a 72 decision written by Justice Souter and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.86 Despite this narrow question presented
on certiorari, the Court addressed much more than the pleading standard for antitrust
cases: it abrogated the crucial “no set of facts” language of Conley that applied to all
pleading standards, which the Court had endorsed for the previous half-century.
A. The Majority Decision
The main question that the Supreme Court set out in Bell Atlantic was “what a
plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”87
Specifically, the question presented was “whether a § 1 complaint can survive a
motion to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications providers engaged
in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context
suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action.”88 The Court
held that “an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will
79

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 550.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 552.

84

Id. at 553 (citing the lower court’s decision, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d
99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)).
85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 554-55 (emphasis omitted).

88

Id. at 548-49.
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not suffice” and that the complaint for such a claim “requires . . . enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”89
But instead of stopping after articulating this requirement of pleading “plausible
grounds to infer an agreement” within the antitrust conspiracy context, the Court
went on to examine the “no set of facts” language presented in Conley—language
that is not limited merely to pleading in antitrust cases but affects pleading standards
as a whole.90 The Court explained that reading Conley’s “no set of facts” language
in isolation would result in all pleading statements being rendered sufficient unless
they were factually impossible to prove.91 The Court “retired” the language of
Conley, declaring that “after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous
observation has earned its retirement.”92 In its place, the Court articulated a new
standard: A complaint requires the pleading of “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”93 The Court explicitly rejected that this new standard
required any “heightened fact pleading of specifics.”94 Instead, plaintiffs—
presumably those presenting antitrust issues or otherwise—would now have to
“nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” lest their
complaint be dismissed.95
B. Justice Stevens’ Dissent
Finding that the majority opinion reflected a “dramatic departure from settled
procedural law,”96 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, authored a lengthy
dissent, noting that “[i]f Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is to be interred, let it not
89

Id. at 556.

90

Id. at 556.

91

Id. at 561.

92

Id. at 563. The Court went on to explain that “[t]he phrase is best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
the complaint.” Id.
93

Id. at 570.

94

Id. (“In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard,
nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only be
accomplished ‘“by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation.”’” (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) and quoting
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993))). The Court specifically claimed that its decision was not contrary to Swierkiewicz, in
which the Court held that the pleading of specific facts was not necessary to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Id. According to the Court, Swierkiewicz was distinguishable
because, in that case, the Court of Appeals had “impermissibly applied what amounted to a
heightened pleading requirement by insisting that Swierkiewicz allege ‘specific facts’ beyond
those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Id. “Here,
in contrast, we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. The Court did not, however, define
what constitutes “plausible.” Id.
95

Id.

96

Id. at 573.
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be without a eulogy.”97 Among other practical concerns with the holding,98 Justice
Stevens specifically noted the effect that the Court’s unanticipated departure from
Conley could have on the many states that had adopted the Conley standard within
their own interpretations of rules of procedure: “I would not rewrite the Nation’s
civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the pleading rules of most of its States
without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so.”99 The dissent
proposed that such a change to the pleading standard should only be made via the
rulemaking process for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that it was wholly
unnecessary for the Court to have reached a discussion of Conley at all.100
C. The First Reference to Bell Atlantic: Erickson v. Pardus
Only fourteen days after deciding Bell Atlantic, the Court added another twist to
the pleading landscape when it released the per curium decision Erickson v.
Pardus.101 In Erickson, a pro se prisoner plaintiff alleged that he had a liver
condition resulting from hepatitis C and that prison officials had wrongfully
terminated his treatment for the condition.102 The prisoner had commenced the yearlong treatment, which required weekly self-injections of medication through the use
of a syringe. However, he was removed from the treatment when prison officials
suspected that the prisoner had been using or allowing others to use the syringe for
illegal drugs.103 According to prison protocol, a prisoner using illicit drugs during
the treatment is banned from the treatment for one year.104 Facing a lengthy
97

Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

98

The dissenters would come to the opposite conclusion as to the actual antitrust question
presented as well:
If the defendants acted independently, their conduct was perfectly lawful. If,
however, that conduct is the product of horizontal agreement among potential
competitors, it was unlawful. Plaintiffs have alleged such agreement and, because the
complaint was dismissed in advance of answer, the allegation has not even been
denied. Why then does the case not proceed? Does a judicial opinion that the charge
is not “plausible” provide a legally acceptable reason for dismissing the complaint? I
think not.
Id. at 573. The dissent identified “[t]wo practical concerns” that “presumably explain” the
Court’s decision. Id.. First, antitrust litigation can be extremely expensive. Id. Second,
evidence of parallel conduct can confuse jurors into believing that such evidence is proof that
the parties acted under an unlawful agreement, when in fact they simply acted in a similar
manner independently. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). While the dissent argues these concerns
“merit careful case management . . . they do not . . . justify the dismissal of an adequately
pleaded complaint without even requiring the defendant to file answers denying [the] charge.”
Id.
99
100

Id. at 579.
Id.

101

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). Bell Atlantic was decided on May 21, 2007,
and Erickson was decided only a few days later on June 4, 2007.
102

Id. at 89.

103

Id. at 90-91.

104

Id.
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eighteen-month delay in his treatment, the prisoner denied that he took the syringe
for any illicit purpose and filed a complaint against the doctor alleging that removing
him from his hepatitis C treatment would put his life in danger in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights.105
The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to allege that the doctor had
caused the prisoner “substantial harm.”106 The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that the prisoner had made “only conclusory allegations” that he suffered harm as a
result of removal from the treatment.107 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the decision, holding that it was error for the court of appeals to conclude that the
allegations were “too conclusory” to demonstrate, at the pleading stage, that the
prisoner had not suffered a cognizable harm as a result of the suspension from his
course of treatment.108
In an attempt to demonstrate what of Conley had survived Bell Atlantic, the
Court cited language in Bell Atlantic that was quoted from Conley, that a statement
in a complaint “need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.’”109 The Court explicitly stated that “[s]pecific facts
are not necessary” in order to satisfy Federal Rule 8(a), perhaps endeavoring to
reinforce that notice pleading survived Bell Atlantic.110 However, this proposition is
undercut by the fact that the prisoner in Erickson was a pro se litigant, and as the
Court acknowledged, “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”111 Pro se
pleadings have always been held to a less stringent standard than have pleadings by
those with counsel.112 It is difficult to construe from Erickson how the Court
intended Bell Atlantic to be applied to non-pro se pleadings in light of this fact.113
Erickson is viewed by some as an attempt by the Court to mitigate the
significance of Bell Atlantic.114 The fact that the case was issued so quickly after
Bell Atlantic suggests that the Court may have anticipated the confusion surrounding
the pleading standard that would result from Bell Atlantic and wished to strategically

105

Id.

106

Id. at 92 (quotations omitted) (citing Recommendation on Defendants’ Motion To
Dismiss p. 12 in Civ. Action No. 05-CV-00405-LTB-MJW).
107

Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 198 F. App’x 694, 698 (10th Cir.
2006)).
108

Id. at 93.

109

Id. (quoting Bell Atl.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
110

Id.

111

Id. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

112

See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.

113

Hon. Colleen McMahon, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 861 (2008) (suggesting that
“Erickson simply means that Twombly’s ‘plausibility’ standard, like all pleading standards, is
to be applied less stringently to pro se plaintiffs.”) Id. (emphasis added).
114

See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 310-11
n.51 (2007).
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reinforce that notice pleading under Conley had not been eliminated.115 Not all have
been convinced.116 In addition to the fact that the plaintiff appeared pro se, the
prisoner’s claim presented a fairly straightforward case: the prisoner pleaded that the
termination of his hepatitis C treatment endangered his life, which is a claim under
the Eight Amendment.117 Such a claim is also plausible because he did in fact suffer
from hepatitis C, which is commonly understood to have fatal consequences if left
untreated.118 Put simply, Erickson was too easy of a case to attempt to flesh out the
relationship between Conley and the new plausibility standard post Bell Atlantic.119
IV. THE LANDSCAPE AFTER BELL ATLANTIC: “NOTICE-PLUS”120 PLEADING
A. The Second Circuit Attempts to Apply “Plausiblity”: Iqbal v. Hasty
The Second Circuit was the first court to discuss the impact of Bell Atlantic on
pleading in Iqbal v. Hasty.121 In Iqbal, the court began its analysis by
acknowledging that “[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for
assessing the adequacy of pleadings has recently been created by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic.”122 The Iqbal court identified four signals which
“point toward a new and heightened pleading standard”: (1) the Court’s disavowal of
Conley’s “no set of facts” language; (2) the Court’s use of numerous phrases to
indicate that more than mere notice of a claim is needed to satisfy a Section One
antitrust violation; (3) the Court’s disregard that “careful case management” alone
could sufficiently dispose of a groundless case early in the discovery process; and (4)
the Court’s use of the word “plausibility” fifteen times to suggest a new standard.123
115

Id.

116

See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 1, at 139. Dodson “doubt[s Erickson] will temper the
import of Bell Atlantic.” Id. at 140; see also Spencer, supra note 1, at 456. Although Spencer
says “[t]he Erickson Court’s nod to notice pleading . . . do[es] soften the edges of Twombly,
seeming to assure readers that not all of Conley’s legacy has been discarded,” Spencer goes on
to explain that the nature of Erickson makes it “not a proper case in which to test how the
Court will apply Twombly in subsequent cases.” Id. at 456-57.
117
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 90. (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment.” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))).
118

Id. at 92.

119

See Spencer, supra note 1, at 456 (“Erickson’s brief homage to notice pleading and the
liberal ethos ring hollow in the context of this clear-cut case . . . .”).
120

Dodson, supra note 1, at 138.

121

Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007). After hearing oral arguments for Iqbal in
early October, the Second Circuit required the parties to submit supplemental briefs
addressing “whether this Court should await the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly v. Bell
Atlantic [sic] . . . before deciding this appeal.” Supplemental Brief for Appellants John
Ashcroft & Robert Mueller at 1, Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 055768-cv, 05-5844-cv, 05-6379-cv, 05-6352-cv, 05-6378-cv, 05-6368-cv, 05-6358-cv, 056388-cv). Twombly v. Bell Atlantic had been decided by the Second Circuit, which may
explain why the court was eager to know the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bell Atlantic.
122

Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155.

123

Id. at 155-56.
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The court then considered five aspects of Bell Atlantic which “point away from a
heightened pleading standard and suggest” a narrow reading of the case as applicable
only to Section One allegations: (1) the Court’s specific disclaimer that it was
imposing a heightened pleading of specific facts; (2) the Court’s explicit approval of
the general allegation of negligence exemplified in Form 9 of the Federal Civil
Rules;124 (3) the Court’s concern with the “sprawling” costs of discovery in antitrust
conspiracy cases and fear that defendants will be pressed to settle “even anemic
cases” that survive the motion to dismiss stage; (4) the Court’s failure to disclaim its
prior statement that “federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and
control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later”; and,
(5) the fact that the Court cited Bell Atlantic as standing for the traditional pleading
requirement that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” under Rule 8 only two weeks
later in Erickson.125
After balancing these competing signals, the Second Circuit concluded that Bell
Atlantic was not limited to the context of antitrust cases due to its sweeping rejection
of Conley’s “no set of facts” language, which had been a key aspect of notice
pleading.126 Instead, the Second Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court had
changed the pleading standard to a “flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a
pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”127 This early
interpretation of Bell Atlantic predicted that the Court had in fact intended to alter
the pleading standard generally, despite discussion among scholars that Bell Atlantic
was limited to the realm of antitrust cases.128 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to the Second Circuit and, as discussed in Part VI, confirmed that the change to
pleading was permanent and pervasive, but not quite as “flexible” as the Second
Circuit had hoped.129

124

Id. at 156. Form 9 (currently Form 11) exemplifies a “Complaint for Negligence,”
giving the hypothetical allegation that a defendant “negligently drove a motor vehicle against
plaintiff who was then crossing [an identified] highway.” Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. APP.
FORM 9). Although this exemplary allegation does not include specific allegations as to how
the driver was negligent, the Bell Atlantic Court approved this type of general allegation as
adequate, while finding that the plaintiffs in Bell Atlantic had fallen short by alleging “merely
legal conclusions” of conspiracy. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
125

Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 156-57.

126

Id. at 157.

127

Id. at 157-58.

128

See Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007) (“The Court used ‘plausibility’ in
its antitrust context, to resolve an existing problem in antitrust law, and it is a misreading of
Twombly to extend ‘plausibility’ beyond that context.”). The Supreme Court expressly
rejected this interpretation in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and
discrimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)).
129

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see infra Part VI.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

17

512

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:495

B. Divergent Views of Plausibility Emerge
After the Second Circuit’s decision, other circuits followed suit, attempting to
address the meaning of Bell Atlantic in their review of motions to dismiss.130
Several vague interpretations and applications have emerged, ranging from findings
that Bell Atlantic significantly changed the pleading standards of Rule 8,131 to not at
all,132 to only “in some cases.”133 For example, after a lengthy analysis of Bell
Atlantic in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, the Third Circuit concluded that the
Supreme Court intended Bell Atlantic to stand for the proposition that Rule 8
“requires not merely a short and plain statement, but instead mandates a statement
‘showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”134 Instead of finding a standard
similar to the Second Circuit’s “flexible plausibility standard,” the Third Circuit
interpreted Bell Atlantic to require “some showing sufficient to justify moving the
case beyond the pleadings to the next stage of litigation.”135 Thus, at least one
circuit court views Bell Atlantic as having specifically added requirements beyond
the text of Rule 8.136
Other courts have focused on the aspects of Conley that Bell Atlantic retained.137
In Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Memorial Institute, the Fourth Circuit did
not cite the “plausibility” language of Bell Atlantic and cited only the portions of
Bell Atlantic that referenced Conley favorably.138 This suggests that the Fourth
Circuit did not view Bell Atlantic as having significantly altered the pleading
standard at all. Likewise, in McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., the Federal Circuit
expressly stated that Bell Atlantic did not change the pleading standard under the
130

See generally Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2008); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d
143 (2d Cir. 2007); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008); Barclay
White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem’l Inst., 262 F. App’x 556 (4th Cir. 2008); Burnette v.
Bureau of Prisons, 277 F. App’x 329 (5th Cir. 2007); Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v.
Symmes Twp., 512 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2008); Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 F. App’x 3 (7th Cir.
2007); Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261 F. App’x 926 (8th Cir. 2008); Grabinski v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 265 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2008); Burris v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
262 F. App’x 103 (10th Cir. 2008); Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir.
2008); Powers v. Wickline, 252 F. App’x 324 (D.C. Cir. 2007); McZeal v. Sprint Nextel
Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
131

See, e.g., Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234; Davis, 516 F.3d at 974

n.43.
132

See Barclay, 262 F. App’x at 560; McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1357 n.4.

133

See Midwest Media Prop., 512 F.3d at 341 n.1.

134

Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234.

135

Id. at 234-35.

136

See id.

137

See Grabinski, 265 F. App’x at 635; Barclay, 262 F. App’x at 560.

138
Barclay, 262 F. App’x at 560 (“Rule 8 ‘requires only “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”’” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))).
Id.
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Federal Rule.139 After briefly analyzing Bell Atlantic, the Federal Circuit concluded
“[t]his does not suggest that Bell Atlantic changed the pleading requirement of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 as articulated in Conley.”140
On the other hand, in Midwest Media Property v. Symmes Township, the Sixth
Circuit interpreted the case as standing for the proposition that “in some cases, a
plaintiff must plead particular facts in their complaint.”141 While acknowledging
that Bell Atlantic had not defined what these “some cases” included, it read Bell
Atlantic to require the pleading of “specific facts” in cases likely to produce
expansive and expensive litigation.142 Still other circuit courts have cited language
from Bell Atlantic acknowledging that it represents a new pleading standard for
evaluating a motion to dismiss, but without providing analysis as to what, if any,
change it embodies.143
V. THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMS BELL ATLANTIC IN ASHCROFT V. IQBAL
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Second Circuit in the Iqbal case in
November 2008, which was viewed by many as an indication that the Court would
shed light on its true intent in Bell Atlantic.144 The Court confirmed that it had in fact
altered the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss.145 Yet, the Court’s
explanation as to how “plausibility” pleading should be applied in federal court does
not present a desirable standard and does not change the fact that Ohio should retain
Conley’s “no set of facts” language for evaluating a motion to dismiss.146
A. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
The facts of Iqbal demonstrate the burden plaintiffs must now overcome due to
the Court embracing heightening pleading and disregarding notice pleading. After
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was arrested on
139

McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

140

Id. The Federal Circuit continued: “In fact, as illustrated above, Bell Atlantic favorably
quoted Conley.” Id. While Bell Atlantic did quote aspects of Conley favorably, it is difficult
to interpret the Court’s rejection of Conley’s key “no set of facts” language as not altering the
pleading standard under Rule 8 at all.
141

Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., 512 F.3d 338, 341 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008).

142

Id.

143

See, e.g., Burnette v. Bureau of Prisons, 277 F. App’x 329, 331 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“Burnette’s pleadings contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face’ with respect to some of the BOP officials named in his lawsuit.” (quoting Bell Atl., 550
U.S. at 570)); Burris v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 262 F. App’x 103, 106 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding
that the complaint’s allegations “failed to meet [the] basic requirements” of being raised above
the “‘speculative level’” (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555)); Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 516 F.3d 955, 974 n.43 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The main Rule 8(a) standard now seems to be
whether the ‘allegations plausibly suggest[] ([and are] not merely consistent with)’ a violation
of the law.” (alterations in original) (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 557)).
144

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008).

145

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“[O]nly a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”).
146

See infra Part VI.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

19

514

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:495

criminal charges and detained by federal officials.147 Iqbal filed a Bivens action148
against federal officials, claiming that the officials subjected him to harsh conditions
and confinement based upon his race, religion, or national origin.149 The twenty-one
count complaint set forth allegations detailing harsh treatment by his jailors as well
as contentions that former Attorney General John D. Ashcroft was the architect of a
policy of unconstitutionally “holding post-September 11th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI.”150 The
allegations against Ashcroft were the only allegations considered before the Court in
Iqbal.151
Both the trial court and the Second Circuit denied Ashcroft’s motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.152 The trial court based its decision upon the then-intact
Conley standard.153 As discussed in Part IV.A, the Second Circuit attempting to
apply the newly announced plausibility standard, denied the motion to dismiss by
holding that the context of the case did not require Iqbal to amplify his claim with
factual allegations in order to render the claim “plausible.”154
The Supreme Court reversed and granted the motion to dismiss.155 In examining
the requirements for a Bivens action, the Court explained that one must “plead and
prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”156 The Court
interpreted this element to require—at the pleading stage—that the plaintiff “plead
sufficient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and implemented the
detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose
of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.”157 Focusing on the
government’s strong defense of qualified immunity, the Court explained that

147

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.

148

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999
(1971).
149

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.

150

Id. at 1944.

151

Id. Specifically, the Court later clarified:

[W]e express no opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent’s complaint against
eh defendants who are not before us. Respondant’s account of his prison ordeal
alleges serious official misconduct that we do not address here. Our decision is
limited to the determination that respondent’s complaint does not entitle him to relief
from [Aschcroft, et. al].
Id. at 1952.
152

Id. at 1944.

153

Id.

154

Id.; see supra Part IV.

155

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. The Court left the decision to the Second Circuit whether to
allow Iqbal to “seek leave to amend his deficient complaint.” Id.
156

Id. at 1948.

157

Id. at 1948-49. (emphasis added).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/9

20

2010]

PLEADING IN OHIO AFTER BELL ATLANTIC V. TWOMBLY

515

“purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the
subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination . . . .”158
The immediate problem with this interpretation is that, although a plaintiff’s
Bivens claim will ultimately hinge on whether discovery reveals evidence of a
discriminatory purpose, such evidence is in the possession of the defendant at the
time of filing a complaint. Without addressing this important issue, the Court
nevertheless analyzed whether the complaint sufficiently demonstrated a
discriminatory purpose through the lens of Bell Atlantic.
The Court re-examined Bell Atlantic and explained that it calls for a “twopronged approach” for analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint.159 First, a court
must accept as true all of the allegations in a complaint, but not legal conclusions.160
Second, all complaints must state plausible claims for relief in order to survive a
motion to dismiss.161
In applying this two-pronged approach to the facts of Iqbal, the Court held that
the complaint’s assertions failed the first prong because they were “bare” and
“conclusory.”162 In a statement that harkens the days of code pleading, the Court
reasoned, “It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations rather than their
extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”163
In what amounts to a blending of the summary judgment standard with a motion
to dismiss, the Court held that the complaint failed the second “plausibility” prong
because the allegations were not “plausible” when considered in light of the Court’s
own reasoning, not in light of any evidence.164 Iqbal pled that the petitioners crafted
a policy of detaining individuals “of high interest” in extremely restrictive conditions
because of their race, religion, or national origin.165 The Court admitted that Iqbal’s
allegation, taken as true, is consistent with a plan of purposefully designating
detainees “of high interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin. But the
Court went on to conclude on its own—at the pleading stage without the benefit of
discovery, argument, or briefing—that “given more likely explanations, they do not
plausibly establish this purpose.”166
The Court continued its reasoning that, in a post-September 11th world, it is
unsurprising that “a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain
158

Id. at 1949.

159

Id. at 1950.

160

Id. at 1949.

161

Id. at 1950.

162
Id. at 1951. Iqbal pled that the petitioners “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject [him]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy,
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest.’” Id. Although the Court noted that these assertions were not “unrealistic
or nonsensical,” it held that they were legal conclusions that were not entitled to be assumed
to be true.
163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

21

516

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:495

individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate,
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to
target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”167 By essentially conducting a review for
summary judgment based upon its own conclusions, the Court held that the
complaint did not plead any “factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest
petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind.”168
Unfortunately, such evidence is not readily accessible to the plaintiff until the
commencement of discovery. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the defense
of governmental qualified immunity “is to free officials from the concerns of
litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’”169 By expecting plaintiffs
to be “omniscient”170 as to their defendant’s state of mind at the pleading stage, the
Court gave significant weight to the government’s defense of qualified immunity at
an inappropriate time in the proceedings.
VI. OHIO DISTRICT COURTS AND THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AFTER BELL ATLANTIC AND
IQBAL
A. Nicsand v. 3M: A Case Similar to Bell Atlantic
Federal courts within the Sixth Circuit have readily applied Bell Atlantic to
motions to dismiss in the antitrust realm and to motions to dismiss generally,
discarding the Conley “no set of facts” threshold and implementing the plausibility
standard. However, the implementation of Bell Atlantic can hardly be characterized
as seamless or without objections. In the antitrust case NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co.,171
the Sixth Circuit noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had made clear that “a ‘naked
assertion’ of antitrust injury . . . is not enough” and went on to hold that “NicSand
simply has not alleged facts establishing that the agreements in and of themselves
created market-entry barriers that caused it a cognizable antitrust injury.”172 The
Sixth Circuit viewed the case to be analogous to Bell Atlantic in that the plaintiff’s
complaint had not alleged enough facts to establish that 3M was plausibly engaging
in illegal competition against NicSand in the sandpaper market.173 Also similar to
Bell Atlantic was the lengthy dissent by Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. accompanying
the opinion, which argued that “it is difficult to see how any antitrust plaintiff—short
of those few omniscient plaintiffs that happen to know every relevant factual detail
before the inception of litigation and without the benefit of discovery—will be able
to overcome a motion to dismiss.”174 Like Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bell Atlantic,
167

Id.

168

Id. Instead, the Court concluded that the complaint could only be read to “plausibly
suggest that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating
terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available
until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.” Id.
169

Id. at 1953.

170

See NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 461 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., dissenting).

171

NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007).

172

Id. at 451, 455.

173

Id. at 458.

174

Id. at 461 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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Judge Martin argued that the court is moving away from the intention of the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure by implementing a standard that requires more than mere
notice.175
B. Muddled Applications by Federal Courts
Most district court and Sixth Circuit appellate decisions have acknowledged that
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard was superseded by Bell Atlantic’s plausibility
standard, even if the courts are less than certain as to how to apply the new
standard.176 Yet, some have erroneously continued to reference Conley’s “no set of
facts” language as if unaware that Bell Atlantic was decided.177 And at least one
Sixth Circuit decision runs the risk of perpetuating confusion as to the current
pleading standard in federal courts due to a blending of Conley and Bell Atlantic. In
Ferron v. Zoomego, Inc., the Sixth Circuit examined the sufficiency of the complaint
by a plaintiff who had alleged that the defendant committed unfair or deceptive acts
in violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA).178 The case was
heard in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, requiring that the court apply Ohio
law. However, as the seminal case Hanna v. Plumer instructs, even when applying
state law in federal court, the federal court must apply its own procedural rules.179
Thus, the Sixth Circuit attempted to apply the Bell Atlantic gloss upon Federal Rule
8, rather than Ohio’s “no set of facts” standard, but instead confused the two by
construing them together as one standard.
The court began its analysis of the defendant’s motion to dismiss by stating that
the court must “determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”180 Only a few sentences
later, the court linked this Conley language to the plausibility standard outlined in
Bell Atlantic, explaining that, although detailed factual allegations are not necessary,

175

See id. at 460-61.

176

See United States ex rel. Snapp, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 503 n.6 (6th Cir.
2008) (acknowledging that “there is some confusion as to when a court should require
particular facts to be pled, as required by Twombly, and when a court should apply a more
liberal pleading standard,” but making no mention of Conley); see also CGH Transport, Inc. v.
Quebecor World, Inc., 261 F. App’x 817, 819 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court
abrogated the pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson . . . .”).
177

See Combs v. Crown Life Ins., No. 1:07-CV-00151, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16702, at
*4-6 (S.D. Ohio March 4, 2008) (referencing Conley v. Gibson as the proper pleading
standard without citing to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly at all).
178

Ferron v. Zoomego, Inc., 276 F. App’x 473 (6th Cir. 2008).

179

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965) (holding that, in a situation of conflict
between a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and a State law for service of process, the Federal
Rule is the valid procedural rule for a federal court to follow when hearing a case under
diversity jurisdiction). “To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function
whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either
the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’[s] attempt to exercise
that power in the Enabling Act.” Id.
180

Ferron, 276 F. App’x at 475 (emphasis added) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc.,
249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001)).
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“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”181 The court
went on to analyze the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that the defendant
committed unfair or deceptive acts in violation of Ohio law.182 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants transmitted hundreds of e-mail messages to the plaintiff’s
account, and the plaintiff stated that each message was a “consumer transaction” and
a “direct solicitation” under Ohio law in violation of OCSPA because each e-mail
indicated that the plaintiff had won a prize, but failed to fully and clearly disclose the
terms and obligations necessary to collect the offer.183 In seizing upon the allegation
that the e-mails were “consumer transactions,” the court held that the “[p]laintiff
failed to plead sufficient allegations respecting the element of a consumer transaction
to survive a motion to dismiss.”184 By pleading specific facts that demonstrated that
the e-mails were “a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance”185 or otherwise
satisfied the definition of a “consumer transaction” under Ohio law, the court
affirmed the decision of the district court to not construe this “legal conclusion” as
true.186 The court concluded, “We are not bound to presume as true Plaintiff’s bald
legal assertion that Defendants’ e-mail messages to him were ‘consumer
transactions’ under . . . the OCSPA.”187
In Ferron, the court clearly applied the Bell Atlantic standard, which requires the
pleading of facts in support of elements of the allegation to make the claim plausible,
despite the court’s mistaken reference to the “no set of facts” language of Conley.188
The federal court was correct in its application of Bell Atlantic due to the procedural
nature of Rule 8, even though the court would have applied Ohio law to the merits of
the claim.189 Yet, had the court actually applied the “no set of facts” language of the
Conley standard, it would likely have come to the opposite conclusion: under notice
pleading, the complaint would have adequately put the defendant on notice as to the
plaintiff’s claim and the basis for that claim. Ferron exemplifies the muddling of the
pleading standard that has resulted in the wake of Bell Atlantic, as well as the hypertechnical pleading requirements that may be demanded when Bell Atlantic is applied.
C. Is Bell Atlantic Creeping into Ohio Courts?
Ferron demonstrates the shift at the federal level that Bell Atlantic has created
away from notice pleading and backward into a heightened form of pleading that
181

Id. at 475 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555).

182

Id. at 475-76.

183

Id. at 475.

184

Id. at 476.

185

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (West 2009).

186

Ferron, 276 F. App’x at 476.

187

Id.

188

While it is true that Conley was not entirely abandoned by the Court in Bell Atlantic, as
demonstrated by the court’s reference to some language from Conley in Erickson, it is clear
that the Court specifically disavowed the “no set of facts” language from Conley in Bell
Atlantic. “The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted
pleading standard.” Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 563.
189

See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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requires the pleading of facts in order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.
Ferron shows that conclusory allegations in a complaint that are unsupported by
specific facts underlying the allegation are open to attack under the new standard.190
Although Bell Atlantic’s pleading standard affects only federal courts within Ohio,
as a former replica of the Federal Rules, federal interpretations of the rules influence
the Ohio Rules. Only a few Ohio state courts have applied Bell Atlantic at all, but
those that have done so have applied the “plausibility” standard in a similarly
confusing and incorrect fashion just as the Sixth Circuit did in Ferron.191 A quick
survey of Ohio state courts reveals that the majority of state courts have not strayed
from Conley after Bell Atlantic; however, the fact that some state courts are
muddling “plausibility” pleading with Conley threatens the continuation of a pureConley standard in Ohio.
1. Many State Courts Retain Conley
While the elusive meaning of Bell Atlantic has caused debate, discussion, and
controversy among federal district and circuit courts, Ohio’s state courts have
remained notably silent on the issue until recently. Most decisions after Bell Atlantic
reaffirm the low-threshold nature of Conley as the appropriate Ohio pleading
standard. For example, in Huffman v. City of Willoughby, an Ohio appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss.192 In explaining the pleading
standard, the court referenced O’Brien’s use of the Conley language that a complaint
is sufficient unless it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim.”193 The court noted further that “[a]s long as there is a set of
facts consistent with the plaintiff’s complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to
recover, the court may not grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”194 In emphasizing
the low bar presented by Ohio’s interpretation of Rule 8, the court highlighted that
190
See Richard O. Halloran, The Fact of the Matter: A Return to Fact Pleading?: Viable
Complaints After Twombly, 44 ARIZ. ATT’Y 20, 24 (2007).
191

See Gallo v. Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 91893, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 879, at *P8-9
(Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (“When granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must
appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief. . . .
However, the claims set forth in the complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable.”);
Williams v. Ohio Edison, No. 92840, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4786, at *P14-15 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2009) (“When granting a motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 12(B)(6), it must appear
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief. . . . However,
the claims set forth in the complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable.”); Vagas v.
City of Hudson, C.A. No. 24713, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5714, at *P7, *P13 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009) (quoting the Conley standard but then citing Bell Atlantic for the proposition that
“conclusory statements in the complaint not supported by facts are not afforded the
presumption of veracity.”); Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., No. 93523,
2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 204, at *P10-11 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (When granting a motion to
dismiss under Civ. R. 12(B)(6), “it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts entitling [her] to relief. . . . However, the claims set forth in the complaint must be
plausible, rather than conceivable.”).
192

Huffman v. City of Willoughby, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6236, at *P52.

193

Id. at *P18 (citing O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 754-55
(Ohio 1975)) (noting that O’Brien quotes Conley).
194

Id. (citing Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ohio 2002)).
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“‘[b]ecause it is so easy for the pleader to satisfy the standard of [Ohio]Civ.R.8(A),
few complaints are subject to dismissal.’”195 The court affirmed the denial of the
motion to dismiss due to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint on its face.196
2. The Eighth Appellate District’s Conley/Bell Atlantic Blend
No Ohio state court reference Bell Atlantic’s pleading standard at all until March
of 2009 in Gallo v. Westfield National Insurance Co. when the Ohio Eighth District
Court of Appeals first applied a version of “plausibility” to pleading standards.197
Like in Ferron, the court did not abandon Conley’s “no set of facts” language but
rather linked Conley and Bell Atlantic’s “plausibility” together.198 The same court
similarly applied the mixed Conley/Bell Atlantic standard again in Williams v. Ohio
Edison,199 explaining the standard as follows:
When granting a motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 12(B)(6), “it must
appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling
her to relief. . . . While Williams cannot survive a motion to dismiss
through the mere incantation of an abstract legal standard, she can defeat
such a motion if there is some set of facts consistent with her complaint
that would allow her to recover. However, the claims set forth in the
complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable. Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly (2007)200.
The Williams case involved a pro se plaintiff who inartfully drafted a complaint
alleging thirteen “arguments” that her wages were unconstitutionally garnished to
satisfy a debt owed to Edison.201 Although the granting of the motion to dismiss was
proper in this case under either Conley or Bell Atlantic, the case demonstrates the
confusion that exists as to the correct pleading standard in Ohio. Absent guidance
from the Supreme Court of Ohio or amendment to the Ohio Civil Rules of
Procedure, some courts in Ohio will continue to adhere to Conley, others may switch
to Bell Atlantic, and others may adopt the Eighth Appellate District’s Conley/Bell
Atlantic blend.202
195

Id. at *P22 (quoting Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Comm’s Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 698
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994)).
196

Huffman, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6236, at *P2.

197

Gallo v. Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 91893, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 879, at *P9 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2009).
198
Id. (“However, the claims set forth in the complaint must be plausible, rather than
conceivable. Bell Atlantic Corp., v. Twombly (2007) . . . .”).
199

Williams v. Ohio Ediso, No. 92840, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4786 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009).
200

Id. at *P14-*15.

201

Id. at *P2.

202

The Eighth Appellate District continues to utilize this unique standard, as all cases
emerging from the court addressing 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss cite the language articulated
in Gallo and Williams verbatim. See Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority, No. 93523, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 204, at *P10-*11 (2010).
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Numerous post-Bell Atlantic cases in Ohio have continued to reference the “no
set of facts” language cited in O’Brien203 as the proper standard for evaluating the
complaint on a motion to dismiss, including ten Ohio Supreme Court cases.204
However, pressures exist that may tempt Ohio to conform to the federal pleading
standard. An increase in defendants filing motions to dismiss and asking the court to
adopt Bell Atlantic might encourage Ohio courts to lean toward the plausibility test
and away from Conley’s “no set of facts.” Those who desire a return to the
federal/state uniformity that Ohio attempted to achieve when it adopted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970 could encourage Ohio courts to adopt plausibility
pleading. Some judges and practitioners may simply believe that Bell Atlantic is a
preferable standard that allows complaints doomed to fail later in litigation to be
weeded out early. However, none of these reasons are sufficient for Ohio to
abandon its adherence to the Conley standard.
VII. OHIO SHOULD NOT ADOPT BELL ATLANTIC
A. Federal/State Uniformity Will Not Be Achieved by Adopting Bell Atlantic Because
Ohio Is No Longer a Federal “Replica”
When Professors Oakley and Coon conducted their key survey of the status of
federal/state uniformity among states with regard to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1986, Ohio was a federal “replica” that mirrored the Federal Rules in

203

See O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975).

204

See Volbers-Clarich v. Middletown Management, Inc., No. 2009-933, 2010 Ohio
LEXIS 1110, at *P12 (Ohio 2010) (“It must appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no
set of facts entitling her to relief.”); Cundall v. U.S. Bank, 122 Ohio St. 3d 188, 198 (Ohio
2009) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (“The trial court, reviewing the complaint and nothing else, may
dismiss the case only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
entitling the plaintiff to recover.”); Goudlock v. Voorhies, 894 N.E.2d 692, 694 (Ohio 2008)
(“[I]t appears beyond doubt that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested
extraordinary relief in habeas corpus.”); Ohio ex rel. Deiter v. McGuire, 894 N.E.2d 680, 683
(Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appears beyond doubt that they could prove no set of facts entitling them to
the requested extraordinary relief in quo warranto and mandamus.”); Ohio ex rel. Agosto v.
Cuyahoga County Ct. Com. Pl., 894 N.E.2d 314, 315 (Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appears beyond doubt
that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief in
mandamus and procedendo.”); Ohio ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. City of Mayfield Heights,
891 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appears beyond doubt that Gilmour could prove no set
of facts warranting the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.”); Keith v. Bobby, 884
N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appears beyond doubt that he could prove no set of facts
entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief in habeas corpus.”); Ohio ex rel. Brooks v.
O’Malley, 884 N.E.2d 42, 44 (Ohio 2008) (“Dismissal of the case is appropriate if, after
presuming the truth of all of the material factual allegations of Brooks’s complaint and
making all reasonable inferences in her favor, it appears beyond doubt that Brooks could
prove no set of facts entitling her to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.”); Rosen
v. Celebrezze, 883 N.E.2d 420, 425 (Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appeared beyond doubt that [this party]
could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary writ of prohibition.”);
Ohio ex rel. Weaver v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 879 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ohio 2007)
(“Dismissals of mandamus actions based upon the existence of an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law are appropriate as long as it appears beyond doubt that relator can
prove no set of facts warranting relief.”).
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all important aspects.205 Since that time, Ohio has varied from the Federal Rules in
at least nine instances, not including the current difference in pleading standards for
Rule 8.206 A follow-up study conducted by Professor Oakley in 2002 found that
Ohio was among several “replica” states tending to move against federal-state
uniformity.207 The fact that Ohio is no longer a federal replica, and has not been for
several years, cuts against any argument that Ohio should adopt the pleading
standard articulated in Bell Atlantic in order to achieve federal/state uniformity.208
Indeed, the text as well as the standards for interpretation of several rules would have
to be revisited in order to achieve true alignment with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure again.209
For example, Rule 4 illustrates a textual and substantive difference that now
exists between the Ohio Rules and the Federal Rules.210 Ohio Rule 4 gives the
simple directive that “[s]ervice of summons may be waived in writing by any person
entitled thereto under Rule 4.2 who is at least eighteen years of age and not under

205

Oakley & Coon, supra note 31, at 1413.

206

John B. Oakley, Perspectives on Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: A
Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 355-56 (2002/2003). The
eight rules in Ohio discussed by Oakley that no longer align with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, either textually or by interpretation, include Rules 4, 11, 16, 26, 30, 33, 45, and 50.
Id. at 369-70.
Additionally, the Federal Rule concerning voluntary dismissal is different from Ohio’s Rule
concerning voluntary dismissal. Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows service of “a notice of
dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary
judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (West 2009). Ohio Rule 41(A)(1)(a) is more liberal
and permits “filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the commencement of trial unless
a counterclaim which cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court has
been served by that defendant.” OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1)(a) (West 2009). For an engaging
discussion about the disparity between these two standards, see S. Ben Barnes, Voluntary
Dismissal in Ohio: A Tale of an Ancient Procedure in a Modern World, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
921 (2009).
207

Oakley, supra note 181, at 356, 369-70.

208

At least one Ohio state court decision supports an argument that courts believe they
should adopt Bell Altantic in order to “maintain” federal-state uniformity . In Vagas v.
Hudson, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Ninth District cited the “no set of facts” language
and Bell Atlantic as being applicable to determining what is required by Rule 8. Vagas v.
Hudson, C.A. No. 24713, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5714, *P13, n.1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). In a
footnote, the court explained it’s reference to Bell Atlantic: “Although Twombly refers to the
Federal Rules and the Ohio Rules are applicable here, the pleading requirements under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and Civ.R. 8(A) are virtually identical. Additionally, the Ohio Rule was
based on the Federal Rule.” Id. at n.1.
209
See id. at 369-70. The differences outlined in this section discuss substantive
differences beyond any textual differences that may exist between the Ohio and Federal Rules
due to the recent amendments to the text of the Federal Rules that went into effect December
1, 2007. The 2007 amendments were specifically textual in nature, and were only intended to
clarify the rules stylistically and implement consistent terminology. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4
(West 2009) (Notes of Advisory Committee on 2007 Amendments).
210

OHIO R. CIV. P. 4(D) (West 2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d).
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disability.”211 However, Federal Rule 4 includes lengthy instructions on how to
request a waiver,212 the consequences of failing to waive,213 the time to answer after
a waiver,214 the results of filing a waiver,215 and a note that waiver of service of
summons does not waive objection to personal jurisdiction or venue.216 Ohio did not
adopt these federal provisions included in the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule
4(d), creating textual and substantive differences between the federal and state Rules
of Civil Procedure regarding waiver of the service of summons.217
Similarly, Rule 11 presents differences in the text of the Ohio and Federal Rules
as well as differences in interpretations of the Rules.218 Both Ohio and Federal Rule
11 attempt to prevent frivolous litigation, which abuses and undermines the court
system, by requiring parties to sign the pleadings and permitting courts to impose
sanctions on an attorney or a pro se party.219 However, the federal and state courts
in Ohio use different tests to determine whether sanctions under Rule 11 are
appropriate.220 In interpreting Rule 11, federal courts impose an objective standard
to determine whether an attorney has filed a frivolous pleading.221 Ohio state courts
apply a subjective standard to determine if the pleading is well grounded.222 This
difference in interpretation between Ohio’s federal and state courts has existed for
decades and is analogous to the situation presented by the competing federal and
state interpretations of Rule 8 pleadings.
Just as different standards in Ohio’s federal and state courts surrounding the
interpretation of Rule 11 co-exist, so too may differing interpretations of Rule 8
survive side by side in Ohio’s state and federal court systems. Ohio need not feel
compelled to adopt the Bell Atlantic standard out of a fear that the Ohio Rules will
no longer be in sync with its Federal counterpart. Rather, as noted by Professor
211

OHIO R. CIV. P. 4(D).

212

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1).

213

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2).

214

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3).

215

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4).

216

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(5).

217

Oakley, supra note 181, at 369.

218

OHIO R. CIV. P. 11 (West 2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (West 2009).

219

Stephen R. Ripps, Ohio Civil Rule 11: Time for Change, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133,
133 (1994).
220

Id.

221

See Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the attorney
had a duty to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing a pleading, and that
asserting a claim before ascertaining whether the claim had any basis in fact violated that
duty, requiring that sanctions be imposed under Federal Rule 11).
222
See Haubeil & Sons Asphalt & Materials, Inc. v. Brewer & Brewer Sons, Inc., 565
N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (emphasizing that a signature under Ohio Rule 11
represents that “to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay”; only willful violations of the rule will result
in sanctions).
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Oakley, Ohio has chosen to diverge from the Federal Rules in multiple instances
since its adoption of the Rules in 1970.223 Choosing to ignore Bell Atlantic is
consistent with Ohio’s current trend of moving away from federal/state uniformity.
Additionally, continued accessibility to the court system by plaintiffs—especially at
the local and state level—supports maintaining the lower-threshold presented by
Conley as a pleading standard.
B. Forum Shopping Is Unlikely and, Should It Occur, Can Be Mitigated
Some might advocate in favor of Ohio adopting Bell Atlantic’s plausibility
standard for fear of forum shopping due to the differing standards between federal
and state courts. Arguably, plaintiffs with a choice between filing in Ohio state or
federal court would choose to file in Ohio state court due to the lower, true notice
pleading threshold embodied by Conley. However, Ohio’s continuation of Conley is
unlikely to result in forum shopping due to a mechanism that assists defendants in
having the case be heard by a federal court and the complaint subsequently tested
against the Bell Atlantic standard: Removal.224
Removal allows a defendant to transfer a state-court case to the federal court in
certain circumstances.225 Aside from a few situations in which claims are not
removable to federal court,226 most claims brought in Ohio state courts that present
issues that initially could have been brought in federal courts may be properly
removed by a defendant to federal court.227 Forum shopping is unlikely to occur
among the subset of plaintiffs who have claims under federal law or mixed state and
federal claims implicating supplemental jurisdiction any more than has already
occurred due to the other non-alignments of the Ohio Rules with the Federal Rules.
Differences in Ohio and Federal civil procedure have continually evolved since
223

See Oakley, supra note 181, at 355.

224

28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006). The statute provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending. . . .
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall
be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
225

See id.

226

Three general exceptions to removal exist. First, state courts are given exclusive
jurisdiction over certain federal claims, such as the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991. See Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Commc’ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1150 (4th
Cir. 1997). Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1445 explicitly designates that certain claims are not
removable to federal courts if brought under certain federal statutes or workmen’s
compensation laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1445. Finally, even if a defendant asserts a federal defense
to a state-law claim, the defendant will be unable to remove the case to federal court under the
well-pleaded complaint rule. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,
152-53 (1908).
227

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
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1970, reflecting procedural and policy preferences by the state. And even if a
plaintiff initially attempts to secure what he or she perceives to be the more
favorable arena of the state court, the defendant’s interests will not be prejudiced due
to the availability of removal.
It is true that Ohio state courts provide a favorable arena for plaintiffs due to the
fact that notice pleading thrives in Ohio under Conley. To stick with Conley means
that plaintiffs in Ohio—many of whom have claims implicating only Ohio law—will
be able to access the court systems easily. Access to the court system is imperative
for a just society, and indeed, the Supreme Court of Ohio has emphasized that
Ohio’s “public policy supports free, unhampered access to the courts for litigants.”228
Such unhampered access would be jeopardized for all plaintiffs with claims under
Ohio law if the state were to adopt Bell Atlantic’s vague plausibility standard. Even
if a marked increase in the filing of complaints at the state-level were to occur, the
slight administrative burdens of processing removal requests do not outweigh the
negative effects Bell Atlantic’s plausibility standard will have on pleading and
accessibility to the courts in Ohio generally.
C. Bell Atlantic’s Heightened Plausibility Pleading Standard Is Undesirable
As alluded to throughout this Note, Bell Atlantic does not present a favorable
alternative to the Conley standard. Having been characterized as “one of the Court’s
most important procedural decisions of the last decade,” Bell Atlantic caught
litigators, scholars, and judges off-guard.229 The fragmented interpretations of its
implications on pleading standards, which have resulted in its wake, have created
great uncertainty in an area of civil procedure that was previously straightforward
and predictable under Conley.230
Bell Atlantic presents a vague plausibility standard that moves away from notice
pleading, which was the cornerstone of the liberalism embodied in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.231 As one irked judge and scholar has noted, the text of “Rule 8
does not require a short and plain statement of the facts underlying a claim.”232 Yet,
Bell Atlantic asks plaintiffs to plead just that. The very word “plausible,” which is
central to the Bell Atlantic standard, is not defined by the Court.233 This may explain
the numerous interpretations of “plausibility” that have resulted.234 Iqbal offered
228

Crawford v. Euclid Nat’l Bank, 483 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Ohio 1985).

229

See McMahon, supra note 118, at 852 (“Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was probably
the least anticipated decision to come out of the 2007 Supreme Court. It also happens to be
one of the Court’s most important procedural decisions of the last decade, with massive
implications for civil litigation.”).
230
See id. at 853 (“We district court judges suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves
puzzled over something we thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a
motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim.”).
231

5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1202 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
232

McMahon, supra note 118, at 853 (emphasis added).

233

See Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 557-58.

234

Compare United States v. Harchar, No. 1:06-cv-2927, 2007 WL 1876510, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio June 28, 2007) (“Twombly merely held that a complaint that alleged only parallel
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little helpful guidance when it tried to explain “plausible”: “[D]etermining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court
to draw on its experience and common sense.”235 Indeed, if “common sense” is the
guide for plausibility, then courts are likely to continue to “inevitably exhibit
different levels of tolerance” for the level of detail necessary to properly assert
factual allegations.236
Before tossing their own interpretations of “plausibility” into the ring of other
interpretations, Ohio courts should ask themselves this: If Bell Atlantic had never
been decided, would they have considered abandoning Conley’s “no set of facts”
pleading standard at all? Echoing Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bell Atlantic, none of
the Supreme Court of Ohio’s more than one hundred decisions utilizing the “no set
of facts” pleading standard seem to “question[],” “criticize,” or express that they are
“puzzl[ed]” by the “no set of facts” language.237 Indeed, the frequency with which
the language has been used suggests just the opposite: Until recently, Ohio had a
well-understood and time-honored pleading standard under Conley. There appears
to be little advantage to entering the tempest surrounding Bell Atlantic unprovoked.
Another problem with plausibility pleading under Bell Atlantic is one that Justice
Stevens emphasized in his extensive dissent.238 Like the claim at issue in Bell
Atlantic, many claims will now require the pleading of facts that are not in the
control of the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint.239 When discovery is
necessary to uncover the facts that support the claim, Bell Atlantic will prevent
plaintiffs from having their day in court unless they are “omniscient.”240 Discovery
and case management are pre-trial procedures better suited for the weeding out of
meritless claims rather than the pleading stage.241

conduct did not state a claim for an antitrust conspiracy. The Supreme Court did not purport
to change the applicable 12(b)(6) standards . . .”) with CGH Transp., Inc. v. Quebecor World,
Inc., 261 F. App’x 817, 819 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court abrogated the
pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson”); see also supra Part IV.
235

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009).

236

McMahon, supra note 118, at 867.

237

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since adopting Conley’s “no set
of facts” language in O’Brien in 1975, the Supreme Court of Ohio has cited the “no set of
facts” language in 129 decisions based on a search through LexisNexis.
http://www.lexisnexis.com (search “Find a Source” for “OH Supreme Court Cases from
1821;” then search “no set of facts”). Not a single case appears to question the validity of that
language. Quite to the contrary, it appears to have become part of Ohio’s common parlance
regarding the review of a motion to dismiss.
238

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 570 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

239

Id. at 572 (stating “instead of requiring knowledgeable executives . . . to respond to
these allegations by way of sworn depositions or other limited discovery—and indeed without
so much as requiring petitioners to file an answer denying that they entered into any
agreement—the majority permits immediate dismissal based on the assurances of company
lawyers that nothing untoward was afoot”).
240

Nicsand, 507 F.3d at 461 (Martin, J., dissenting).

241

See Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, rather than reducing case-load management at the trial court level,
imposing a plausibility standard within Ohio courts will likely increase the filing of
motions to dismiss by defendants who are encouraged by the heightened standard as
presented in Bell Atlantic.242 Under Conley, Ohio courts may continue to evaluate a
complaint to determine whether it states a claim for which relief may be granted
under 12(B)(6) as it has for the past thirty years.243 The low-threshold presented by
Conley’s “no set of facts” language will ensure that plaintiffs—at least at the state
level—will usually be given the chance to have their claim heard. And, state judges,
litigants, and plaintiffs will be spared the uncertainty of construing what is
sufficiently “plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss in the absence of meaningful
guidance from the Court. Faced with the decision to align with the federal pleading
standard or maintain its independence, Ohio should choose to take the path of
pretending that Bell Atlantic and Iqbal simply do not exist.244
VIII. CONCLUSION
Notice pleading is not dead. Although the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic
explicitly avowed that it was not imposing a heightened pleading standard,245 it is
difficult to ignore the shift away from notice pleading embodied by the new
plausibility standard. Ashcroft v. Iqbal confirmed the sea-change in pleading
standards, but merely provided additional evidence as to why it is a step in the wrong
direction away from notice pleading. While only the wraiths of notice pleading may
remain in federal courts—especially those that have construed Bell Atlantic’s
plausibility standard strictly—notice pleading can still be saved in the state courts of
Ohio.
Must Ohio retire Conley from its prominent and well-weathered position as the
pleading standard for Ohio? No. Just as Ohio has chosen over the years to vary
from its Federal Rule counterparts in other areas of procedure, the difference in
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint that now exists between federal and state
courts in Ohio demonstrates a difference in procedural values. By maintaining
Conley, Ohio state courts will underscore a preference for clarity, tradition, the use
of discovery as the vehicle for weeding out meritless claims, unhampered access to
the courts by plaintiffs, and keeping notice pleading—the foundation of our
procedural system—alive.

242

See McMahon, supra note 118, at 868 (commenting that “[t]he Supreme Court may
have thought it was providing relief to the federal docket by making it easier to dismiss
complaints, but that will not be the result” due to the increased number of motions to dismiss
that will be filed and the potential complexity of interpreting them that may emerge).
243

See generally O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio
1975).
244

See supra Part IV.

245

Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 570.
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